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COMMENTS

JUST THE FACTS, MA’AM – A REVIEW OF THE PRACTICE OF
THE VERBATIM ADOPTION OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A limited number of minor ambiguities or defects in the Federal rules have
been developed, but the courts have proved themselves skillful in ironing out
such difficulties, and some of the points have been or soon may be adequately
dealt with by judicial construction and thus disappear.1

I. INTRODUCTION
It is common, recognized practice for district courts to adopt verbatim the
findings of fact and conclusions of law that the prevailing party puts forward in
its memorandum of law.2 Generally, this practice involves the district court
requesting counsel to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law before or
after the trial.3 This spares the court the sometimes difficult and timeconsuming process of writing its own explanation of the facts and how the law
applies to them. While this practice allows courts to operate more efficiently,
the procedure the court adopts in requesting and reviewing a submission, or
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Advisory Committee’s Report, 1 F.R.D. 79, 80 (1940).
2. See, e.g., In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1st Cir. 1970) (“The practice of
inviting counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is well established as
a valuable aid to decision making.”); Howard v. Howard, 34 P. 1114, 1117 (Kan. 1893) (“It is not
an uncommon practice for the attorneys of the respective parties to formulate such findings as
they desire to have made, leaving the court to adopt them, or such of them as in its judgment have
been established by the proofs.”). See also Hon. Gunnar H. Nordbye, Improvements in Statement
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 F.R.D. 25, 30 (1940) (relaying his experience as a
judge asking counsel for help in framing the findings of fact); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2578 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998).
3. See Hill & Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Tenn.
1976).
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submissions, may cause losing parties to feel as though their position has not
been thoroughly considered.4 This results in appeals.5 In the past, when
presented with findings of fact or conclusions of law drawn verbatim from one
of the party’s memorandums of law, the courts of appeals struggled with the
decision whether to apply the clearly erroneous standard mandated by FRCP
526 or review the facts with heightened scrutiny.7 Analyzing the trial court’s
findings with heightened scrutiny not only expends additional court resources,
but it also inevitably undermines the respect appellate courts are to give to the
findings of the trial court. The Supreme Court settled the standard of review in
the 1980s, but recently courts seem to have reverted back to a heightened
standard. This change is based on the procedure at the lower court. Despite
the precedent set by the Supreme Court and despite the Federal Rules
Committee’s best effort to draft a clear rule, courts remain unsettled regarding
the specific procedure to apply when adopting findings and conclusions
verbatim, and the proper standard of review on appeal.
Based on Rule 52, a court is required to set forth the findings of fact
separately from the conclusions of law.8 Findings of fact are defined as
“[d]eterminations from the evidence of a case . . . concerning facts averred by
one party and denied by the another.”9 Conclusions of law are defined as
4. See Las Colinas, 426 F.2d at 1008.
5. Under Rule 52, as opposed to state law, where parties must request specific findings of
fact, parties in federal court need not request findings because the district court is required to find
the facts specially. On appeal, parties have the option to raise the issue of the judge’s adoption of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants preserve this issue under Rule 52(b), which
states:
On a party’s motion filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may
amend its findings – or make additional findings – and may amend the judgment
accordingly. The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. When
findings of fact are made in actions tried without a jury, the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the findings may be later questioned whether or not in the district court the
party raising the question objected to the findings, moved to amend them, or moved for
partial findings [under Rule 52(c)].
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b). See generally 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1999 (1995); 105 NY JUR. 2D Trial
§ 583 (1992); 54 A.L.R. 3d § 868 (1974).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 52. Courts refer to the following text in Rule 52(a) when discussing
verbatim adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law:
[T]he court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court judge to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court.
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
7. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
9. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 437 (6th ed. 1991).
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“[s]tatement[s] of court[s] as to law applicable on basis of [the] facts.”10 One
commentator noted that requiring trial courts to indicate their findings of fact
serves three main purposes: (1) aid the appellate court in reviewing the case,11
(2) narrow and clarify the issues for the proper application of estoppel and res
judicata,12 and (3) ensure the trial judge carefully analyzed and reviewed the
facts.13
Arguably, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
indistinguishable.14 However, when a judge adopts these findings and
conclusions verbatim, their significance becomes more apparent.
This article analyzes the practice of the verbatim adoption of findings of
fact and conclusions of law, focusing on federal district courts. Part II outlines
the evolution of the practice through the history of Rule 52 and through the
judiciary’s response to district courts who adopt findings of fact and
conclusions of law verbatim. Part III discusses circumstances in which it may,
or may not, be appropriate to adopt findings and conclusions verbatim. Part IV
analyzes the various procedures district courts apply when adopting findings
and conclusions, and whether appellate courts consistently apply the clearly
erroneous standard. Part V outlines the various ethical and professional
obligations of judges and attorneys. The article concludes that the practice of
adopting findings and conclusions verbatim will continue to evolve and endure
in the courts. However, the history of the practice balanced with the duties of
attorneys and the judiciary provides sufficient checks against abuse of the
practice.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ACCEPTED PRACTICE
A.

History of Rule 52

Enacting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was a milestone in the
evolution of the American judicial system, particularly in light of the
significance of findings of fact and the standard of review on appeal. The
purpose of the rules was to adopt a uniform system for all federal cases,
thereby abolishing the procedural distinction between equity cases and
common law actions that had existed since 1789.15 Distinguishing between the
10. Id. at 200.
11. 9A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2571 n.8.
12. Id. § 2571 n.9.
13. Id. § 2571 n.10.
14. See Nevin Van de Streek, Why Not ‘Findings of Law’ and ‘Conclusions of Fact’ and
Opinions About Both?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 109 (1994) (suggesting that there is not really a
difference between findings and conclusions).
15. See generally Hon. W. Calvin Chestnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 533, 540 (1936) (analyzing the proposed federal rules) (“[T]he new
rules as a whole professedly abolish the distinction between law and equity saving only the
preservation of jury trial as required by the 7th Amendment.”); Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F.
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two systems on appeal, one commentator noted that equity review on appeal
consisted of a re-examination of the entire record of both the facts and the law,
where Rule 70½ would apply.16 Alternatively, an appeal at law was limited to
a review of the alleged errors made by the trial court.17 Also at law, before the
trial, a party could waive a jury trial so that a judge, instead of a jury, would
determine the facts of the case.18
While most welcomed a uniform procedural system, the rule that is now
Rule 52, was first Rule 68,19 and various commentators raised issues
surrounding the appropriate weight of the findings in light of the judge’s role
as well as the potential for an increased number of appeals.20 Specifically, the
main issues consisted of (1) the threat of less weight being given to the
findings compared to verdicts, (2) the significance of the trial judge’s ability to
Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190-91 (1937) (discussing the issues
surrounding the adoption of rules uniting actions at equity and law regarding findings of fact).
16. Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 190. For a more historical account of the Federal Rules
of Equity, see Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary
Evidence or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506 (1963) [hereinafter Note] (summarizing
the evolution of Rule 52). Equity Rule 70½ stated in part:
In deciding suits in equity, including those required to be heard before three judges, the
court of first instance shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon; and, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions, the court of first
instance shall similarly set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action.
9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52App.01 (3d ed. 1999).
17. Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 190.
18. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501 (repealed 1948). The statute allowed
parties to waive a jury trial, stating in part:
[I]ssues of fact in civil cases in any circuit court of the United States may be tried and
determined by the court without the intervention of a jury, whenever the parties, or their
attorneys of record, file a stipulation in writing with the clerk of the court waiving a jury.
The finding of the court upon the facts, which finding may be either general or special,
shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.
Id. See also Edson R. Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where
Juries are Waived, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1937) (reviewing the formalities of findings of fact and
conclusions of law in common law actions).
19. Rule 68 stated in part:
In all actions tried without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately the conclusions of law thereon; and in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions, the court shall similarly set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. The findings of the court in such cases shall
have the same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in equity.
See William W. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 68,
70-71 (1936) (citing Rule 68).
20. Compare Chestnut, supra note 15, at 540-41, with Blume, supra note 19, at 71-73
(supporting Rule 68 in light of Judge Chestnut’s criticism), and Clark, Letter to the Editor,
Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 129 (1936)
(responding to Prof. Blume’s article).
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see and hear the witnesses as opposed to the “cold printed record,”21 and (3)
the compelling interest of reducing the number of appeals.22
To address one of these major issues, in an amendment in 1946, the
committee drafting the Rules of Federal Procedure tried to resolve confusion
regarding the use of findings of fact in court memoranda or opinions.23
According to the Committee, the amendment would “remove any doubt that
findings and conclusions are unnecessary upon decision of a motion.”24 Courts
tried to conform to this standard, adapting its findings of fact to be a “fair
presentation” for the appellate court.25 The findings and conclusions only
needed to include the most relevant details relating to issues in the case.26
Courts were careful not to set a standard so high that it would “impose onerous
labors on a district judge,”27 and maintained their support for counsel’s “aid” to
the trial judge in drafting or correcting the findings of fact or conclusions of
law.28 In its attempt to create a uniform standard, however, the Committee
drafted a rule allowing such a high degree of subjectivity that courts
interpreted Rule 52(a) inconsistently.29 This confusion resulted in various
procedures of adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim,
folllowed by appellate courts establishing a standard of review higher than the
clearly erroneous standard.30

21. Chestnut, supra note 15, at 540.
22. See generally Blume, supra note 19, at 71-73 (arguing points presented by Judge
Chestnut).
23. See 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 52App.02. The committee added two sentences:
If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as
provided by Rule 41(b).
Id.
24. Id.
25. Matton Oil Transfer Corp. v. The Dynamic, 123 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1941).
26. See United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1942).
27. Matton, 123 F.2d at 1001.
28. Id.
29. See generally Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-16 (9th Cir. 1962); Terri Y. Lea,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a): Applicability of the “Clearly Erroneous” Test to Findings
of Fact in All Nonjury Cases, 29 HOW. L.J. 639 (1986); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(a):
Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645,
655 (1988) (“The courts apply the clear error standard to such cases, at times even when there is
telling circumstantial evidence that the district judge has not undertaken the responsibility of
independent decision.”).
30. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1965).
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The Road to the Supreme Court

It is not surprising that district courts have interpreted Rule 52
inconsistently. There are numerous ways in which a court may request
findings and conclusions from parties and review those submissions.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has addressed the practice of adopting
findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim in only a few cases, and in
those cases, the Court narrowly tailored its opinion to the facts of the case.31
These opinions do not embrace a specific procedure; the Court merely reviews
the lower court’s procedure in requesting the findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Generally, an upper-level court focuses on the district court’s duty to
demonstrate independent thought and analysis in its opinion, which is the same
guideline adopted by state courts.32
1. The Significance of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Before the issue of the verbatim adoption of findings and conclusions even
arose, the Supreme Court recognized the need for a court to draft findings of
fact independent of the final opinion in Interstate Circuit, a case on direct
appeal.33 In Interstate Circuit the trial court did not write formal findings,
contrary to the requirement under Rule 70½.34 The Supreme Court stated that
a district court’s opinion would not constitute an adequate substitute for
findings of fact.35 Emphasizing the significance of findings in a bench-tried
case, the Supreme Court noted that for a district court to satisfy its duty, it
should dispose of all the issues in the case “appropriately and specifically” in
special and formal findings of fact.36 The later adoption of Rule 52 eliminated
any confusion created by Rule 70½ by explicitly requiring that a court must
find and state the facts at issue.37
While the Court thus made clear the duty to state findings of fact and
conclusions of law, courts were left to determine the extent to which they
could adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law into an opinion. Only a
few years after Interstate Circuit, the Second Circuit confronted a case in
which it was apparent that the lower court had “mechanically adopted” the

31. See infra Part II.B.3.
32. See, e.g., State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 281-85 (Mo. 1997) (Stith, J., dissenting);
Mullenix-St. Charles Properties, L.P. v. City of St. Charles, 983 S.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Mo. App.
1998); Outdoor Advertising Ass’n of Ga. v. Dep’t of Transp., 367 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988).
33. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 304 U.S. 55 (1938).
34. Id. at 56.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 55-56.
37. See Nordbye, supra note 2, at 28-29 (discussing the significance of findings of fact under
Rule 52 in contrast to Rule 70½).
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proposed findings of fact into the opinion.38 The district court’s opinion in
Forness included the objections to the defendant’s proposed findings, and upon
further investigation, the Second Circuit determined that some of these
findings were neither supported by the evidence39 nor substantially consistent
with the court’s opinion.40 The “mechanically adopted” term became the
standard used by courts to analyze the extent to which the lower court analyzed
the facts and wrote the opinion using independent thought.41 This threshold
acknowledged the court’s enduring and significant role of fact-finding.42
Judge Frank stated, “The correct finding . . . of the facts of a law suit is fully as
important as the application of the correct legal rules to the facts as found.”43
2.

Standard of Review

While both courts and commentators recognized the significance of
findings, the issue of the appropriate standard of review remained
unresolved.44 However, in Gypsum, the Supreme Court reviewed the findings
in detail, and applied the clearly erroneous standard of review outlined in the
newly adopted Rule 52.45 This standard encompassed the same premise
underlying the practice in equity: the district court’s findings, while not
determinative, should carry great weight with the appellate court since it has
observed witness testimony firsthand.46 The Court further defined the clearly
erroneous standard with respect to findings, stating: “A finding is ‘clearly
erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court

38. Forness, 125 F.2d at 930, 942.
39. Id. at 656. See also United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944)
(“[The findings] must stand or fall depending on whether they are supported by evidence.”).
40. Forness, 125 F.2d at 942. (“Such a result can usually be avoided by . . . filing findings
with the opinion.”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); McDowell v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 753 F.2d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 1985) (selecting certain submitted findings and
independently writing some findings was sufficient to show there was not a “mechanical”
adoption of the findings of fact); Apex Oil Co. v. Vanguard Oil & Serv. Co., 760 F.2d 417, 42122 (2d Cir. 1985) (deleting argumentative language and including independent findings were
sufficient to show there was not a “mechanical” adoption of the findings and conclusions).
42. See Forness, 125 F.2d at 942. See generally infra Part V.A.
43. Id.
44. See generally Solomon Oliver, Jr., Appellate Fact Review Under Rule 52(a): An Analysis
and Critique of Sixth Circuit Precedent, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 667, 674 (1985) (analyzing the
appropriate standard of review with respect to the type of evidence presented and to findings
applying the law to the facts).
45. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
46. Id. See also Clark & Stone, supra note 15, at 207-08; Note, supra note 16, at 514-15
n.51.
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on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”47
Despite the Court’s clear precedent in Gypsum, appellate courts remained
skeptical when a lower court adopted findings and conclusions verbatim. To
address this concern, the Third Circuit established a higher standard of review
than the clearly erroneous standard for findings of fact prepared ex post facto.48
The Fourth Circuit also adopted this standard.49 For example, in Roberts v.
Ross, the trial court concluded that the parties had not made a promise in an
oral contract dispute regarding a commission, and found for Ross.50 First, the
trial court announced its decision for Ross as a general verdict, and did not
write any facts or conclusions of law.51 Then, the judge directed Ross’ counsel
to write the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and form of judgment.52 The
district court adopted those findings and conclusions verbatim.53 On appeal,
Judge Maris criticized the procedure the trial court had applied, stating the
procedure “flies in the face of the spirit and purpose, if not the letter, of Rule
52(a),” and consequently, the court had “no indication of the legal standard
under which the evidence was considered.” 54
According to Judge Maris, the trial court’s duty is to “formulate and
articulate” the facts, accomplishing two main purposes: (1) enable the parties
to better understand the court’s reasoning and analysis and (2) assist the

47. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395, 396 (“Where such testimony is in conflict with
contemporaneous documents we can give it little weight, particularly when the crucial issues
involve mixed questions of law and fact.”). At that time, therefore, the Supreme Court was
“unclear” regarding whether the clearly erroneous standard applied to all categories of fact
evidence. Oliver, supra note 44, at 674.
48. See Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751-52; William A. Kaplin, Federal Procedure: Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(a): The Role of Counsel in Preparation of Special Findings of Fact: Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d
747 (3d Cir. 1965), 51 CORNELL L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1966).
49. See, e.g., Cuthbertson v. Biggers Bros., Inc., 702 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983); Chicopee Mfg. Corp. v.
Kendall Co., 288 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1961).
50. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751.
51. Id.
52. Id. The appellate court did not state whether the losing party either submitted any
findings or conclusions, or whether they were given an opportunity to respond to the prevailing
party’s findings and conclusions. The lower court opinion is not published.
53. Id. at 748.
54. Id. at 751. Judge Maris stated:
The purpose of [Rule 52] is to require the trial judge to formulate and articulate his
findings of fact and conclusions of law in the course of his consideration and
determination of the case and as a part of his decision making process, so that he himself
may be satisfied that he has dealt fully and properly with all the issues in the case before
he decides it and so that the parties involved and this court on appeal may be fully
informed as to the basis of his decision when it is made.
Id.
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appellate court in reviewing the case.55 When a trial court decides the outcome
of a case and then later adopts one party’s findings verbatim, the appellate
court lacks a sufficient foundation for knowing that the adopted findings were
in fact the basis of the court’s decision.56 To discourage this practice, the
Third Circuit held that unless the trial court could prove it had studied the facts
or had written the findings, the appellate court would adopt a more stringent
standard of review.57 Under this higher standard of review, the appellate court
would analyze the findings and conclusions “more narrowly” and given them
“less weight.”58
Twenty years later, in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the
Supreme Court supported the circuits’ condemnation of trial courts that
“mechanically” adopt findings of fact and conclusions of law and cautioned
appellate judges to uphold their duty to review.59 In El Paso, after the trial, the
district court judge announced he was going to dismiss the case, would not
write an opinion, and instructed the prevailing party, El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
to write the findings of fact.60 Counsel submitted 130 findings of fact and one
conclusion of law, all of which the court adopted verbatim.61 The Supreme
Court rejected the district court’s “mechanical adoption” of the findings of fact
and implied the lower court had failed to satisfy its primary duty to prepare
findings.62 According to Justice Douglas, the judge must prove the findings
were “the product of the workings of his mind.”63 Despite its disapproval, the
Supreme Court did not reject the lower court’s findings because the evidence
supported them.64 Furthermore, the Court left the issue of the appropriate
standard of review for another day. Justice Douglas did not announce the

55. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 751.
56. Id. at 751-52.
57. Id. at 752 n.5 (citing Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 259 F.2d 398,
400-01 (5th Cir. 1958)); Mesle v. Kea Steamship Corp., 260 F.2d 747, 750 (3d Cir. 1958)
(analyzing the facts and conclusions narrowly).
58. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752.
59. 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964). The United States charged El Paso Natural Gas Co. with a
violation of the Clayton Act after the company acquired the assets of a pipeline company,
claiming the acquisition reduced the level of competition in California’s natural gas market. Id. at
652.
60. El Paso, 379 U.S. at 656.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 657 n.4 (referring to Judge J. Skelly Wright, who warned judges not to sign “what
some lawyer puts under your nose,” since the findings may be tainted with a zealous lawyer’s
version of the facts. He stated, “When these findings get to the courts of appeals they won’t be
worth the paper they are written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining why the
judge decided the case.”).
63. Id. at 656.
64. Id. at 657.
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clearly erroneous standard per se, but he did acknowledge the Court’s reliance
on Rule 52 in reaching its decision.65
A decade later, the Supreme Court again had an occasion to criticize a
district court that adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim.66
In another case on direct appeal, the lower court had failed to include citations
to the transcripts, making review more difficult.67 The Court strongly
recommended that district courts assist appellate courts by entering an opinion
“analyzing the relevant precedents in light of the record” so that it would not
be “deprived of this helpful guidance.”68 Again, despite its criticism, the
Supreme Court did not analyze the facts with greater scrutiny; instead, it
applied the clearly erroneous standard pursuant to Rule 52.69
3.

The Supreme Court Speaks

Even though the Supreme Court had repeatedly expressed its disapproval
of courts adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim, it did not
definitively announce the appropriate standard of review until Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City.70 By the adopting the clearly erroneous standard as the sole
basis for review, the Supreme Court rejected the heightened standard of review
that various circuits, such as the Third and Fourth Circuits, had consistently
applied.71 In Anderson, Phyllis Anderson, represented by the EEOC, sued
Bessemer City, North Carolina in a sexual discrimination suit after the city
hired a male to be recreation director.72 The district court decided in favor of
Anderson, and then asked her counsel to submit detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, allowing the city to submit objections to the findings.73
Ultimately, the trial judge issued its own findings of fact and conclusions of
law, by adopting the “substance” of the submitted findings of fact, with some
editing and additions.74 The Fourth Circuit strongly disapproved of this
practice and determined that the trial court erred in requesting the findings of
fact ex post facto and in adopting the “substance” of the prevailing party’s

65. El Paso, 379 U.S. at 657 n.4.
66. United States v. Marine Bancorporation Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 615 n.13 (1974) (citing El
Paso, 376 U.S. at 656-57).
67. Id. The findings of fact did not include cites to the transcript.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
71. See, e.g., Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752 (establishing a higher standard of review for findings
of fact and conclusions of law adopted verbatim).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 572-73; see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 717 F.2d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 1983).
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findings.75 Following precedent, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts with
heightened scrutiny.76
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that the determining
factor was whether the judge “uncritically accepted” the findings submitted by
the prevailing party.77 In Anderson, this did not appear to be the situation.
First, the Court reasoned that the lower court had presented a general
framework and had requested Anderson to provide more detailed findings.78
Also, the city had sufficient opportunity to respond to the proposed findings.79
Finally, the trial court had “considerably” modified the original findings of fact
in both organization and content.80 Considering these factors, the Supreme
Court did not undergo the same heightened standard of review that had been
applied by circuits that condemned the practice. Instead, the Supreme Court
deferred to the clearly erroneous standard under Rule 52(a).81
The Court acknowledged the meaning of clearly erroneous is “not
immediately apparent,” but citing the clearly erroneous standard and the
language in Gypsum,82 the Court would not overturn the findings unless there
was evidence that a mistake had been committed.83 Moreover, based on the
history of Rule 52, the Court stated that the duties of an appellate judge do not
include a de novo review of factual issues.84 The court maintained that the
determination of whether a mistake has been made does not allow an appellate
judge to reverse a decision because he or she would have decided the case
differently.85 Instead, the appellate court must defer to the trial judge’s
findings of fact.86

75. Anderson, 717 F.2d at 156.
76. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 572-73.
81. Id. at 573. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
83. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573; see also Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.
84. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395
U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). Compare Hon. John F. Nangle, The Even Widening Scope of Fact Review
in Federal Appellate Courts – Is the “Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 409 (1981) (warning readers of the expansion of the appellate courts who review the facts),
with Hon. John C. Goldbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts – An Available and Appropriate
Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 366 (1982) (supporting the appellate courts’ review of the facts).
85. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
86. Id. at 575. Rule 52 requires the appellate court to defer to the trial judge’s findings of
fact especially if they are based on “determinations of credibility,” as opposed to findings based
strictly on documentary evidence. In so deciding, the Supreme Court codified the language in
Rule 52(a) stating, “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . .” STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 778 (4th ed.
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The Court thus concluded the Fourth Circuit interpreted the evidence and
ruled according to the decision it would have made at the trial court level,
which amounted to a de novo review of the findings.87 This violated the
appellate court’s obligation to defer to the trial court’s findings of fact.88
Therefore, the clearly erroneous standard applied only to the trial court’s
findings, and the Court’s review of those findings did not indicate that they
were clearly erroneous.89
III. KNOWING WHEN TO SAY WHEN: CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND
COMPLEXITY OF A CASE
A.

Intellectual Property: Patents

In cases involving intellectual property, such as patents, commentators and
courts seems less likely to criticize the verbatim adoption of findings of fact
and conclusions of law.90 The inherently complex and sometimes confusing
nature of patents makes the facts difficult to discern for judges who are not
technically oriented. Most circuits have explicitly recognized the distinction
between “ordinary” cases and complex patent cases. These circuits seem to

1996). See generally Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir.
1985); 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 16, § 52App.06 and accompanying text.
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun stated he might decide differently if
the findings of fact were based on documentary evidence. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 581. See Lea,
supra note 29, at 651-52.
87. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 576. The district court read the evidence independently and then
decided in favor of Phyllis Anderson based on her diverse qualifications, which fit the job
description. The appellate court, however, interpreted the job differently and concluded that
another (male) applicant was better qualified. Id. at 576-77.
88. Id. at 577. Justice White had already confirmed the credibility of the trial judge’s
findings of fact. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
89. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577, 580-81. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, cautioned
appellate courts not to apply the clearly erroneous standard in Rule 52(a) in a “conclusory
fashion.” He stated the majority’s discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s “meticulous” review of the
record was not criticism of its “comprehensive review of the entire record of the case,” since
some cases may require this kind of “burdensome” review. Id. at 581.
90. See generally Bradley G. Lane, Note, A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobviousness
from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REV.
1157 (1987) (providing a detailed explanation of appellate review of patents); Maureen McGirr,
Note, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit: Note, Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.: De Novo Review and the Federal Circuit’s
Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 963 (1987) (discussing the
Federal Circuit’s application of the clearly erroneous standard of review may overstep the
boundaries of Rule 52(a)); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2591.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

JUST THE FACTS, MA’AM

209

recommend courts should adopt the proposed findings verbatim if the court
lacks the requisite knowledge to draft its own findings.91
In addition to such substantive issues, the procedural posture in patent
cases differs from other civil cases because patent disputes may originate at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).92 If an applicant is
dissatisfied with the decision made by the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (“BPAI”) at the USPTO, the applicant may appeal at the district
court level or at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Court.93 In
Gechter v. Davidson, the Federal Circuit held that the BPAI must write
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.94 Similar to district courts,
predicted one commentator, administrative patent judges will soon require
submission of findings and conclusions – on disks, making it easier for courts
to revise and edit those submissions.95 If the case is appealed, the Federal
Circuit will apply the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.96 As a result,
similar to other civil cases, parties might request the appellate court to analyze

91. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464, 468 n.6
(10th Cir. 1980) (citing Photo Elecs. Corp. v. Ferrex Corp., 581 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1978)
(“Although the practice has been disapproved, we have indicated that it may be permissible in
cases ‘involving highly technical issues such as may be involved in patent cases and complex
scientific problems.’”) (citation omitted); Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C & P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d
960, 962 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[I]n areas of highly specialized litigation the typical judge is apt to be
unfamiliar with the nomenclature common to the art or science involved. In such cases he needs
help in reducing his ultimate decision to accurate and understandable words.”); Louis Dreyfus &
Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 738 (5th Cir. 1962) (stating the “indispensable” aid of
counsel submitting findings in cases where the facts deal with patents); Las Colinas, 426 F.2d at
1009 (citing Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (1st Cir. 1965) (supporting the
verbatim adoption of the findings and conclusions to avoid scientific error)).
92. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1997). After review of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, a party may appeal a decision to the United States
Court of Appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 141. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.301 (1996), construed in Gechter,
116 F.3d at 1457.
93. This circuit was created in 1982 and is assigned to hear patent cases. See 35 U.S.C. §
144 (1994) stating in part, “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
review the decision form which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark
Office.” See also McGirr, supra note 90, at 964-65 n.8; notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
94. Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1460.
95. See Charles L. Ghols, The BPAI and the TTAB are Required to Set Forth Specific
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Adequate to Form a Basis for Appellate Review, 80 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1998); see also Roger G. Strand, The Courtroom of the
Future, 28 JUDGES J. 8 (1989) (suggesting that computer-integrated courtrooms should become
more widespread to increase efficiency and production).
96. Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457-58. See also Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d
1112, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (supporting the clearly erroneous standard of review); Hybritech Inc.
v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing the application
of Rule 52 in the Federal Circuit in light of the Anderson decision). See generally 119 F.R.D. 45,
167 (1988); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2591; Lane, supra note 90, at 1164 n.38.
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the facts and accord them less weight.97 The Federal Circuit stated that it will
not apply this higher standard because “[i]t is acceptable for a trial court to
adopt ‘many or most of the parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, particularly if skillfully and wisely drafted.”98
B. Civil Cases v. Criminal (Death Penalty) Cases
Adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law outside the civil law
context creates new issues since a court may be deciding the fate of a
defendant, an especially solemn duty in death penalty cases.99 In Kenley, the
Missouri Supreme Court concluded that in light of the common practice of
adopting findings and conclusions, so long as the court “thoughtfully and
carefully” considered the parties’ proposed findings, the lower court did not
err.100 But the lone dissenter highlighted the “qualitative difference” between
death and other forms of punishment, both in criminal and civil law the
obvious difference being the finality of death.101 In light of these differences,
the Florida Supreme Court stated: “The trial judge has the single most
important responsibility in the death penalty process. Under this process, a
trial judge may not impose the death penalty unless he or she articulates in
writing his or her factual findings and the reasons for imposing the death
penalty.”102 Continuing her analysis in Kenley of the verbatim adoption in
death penalty cases, Judge Stith also added that upper-level courts have a duty
to review to the findings to “determine whether the judge below, the judge who
actually heard the evidence, exercised his or her independent judgment in
adopting the . . . findings.”103 Nevertheless, if the judge adopts the findings of
fact and conclusions of law verbatim, the analysis on appeal will not change;
the appellate judge must still determine whether the trial judge reviewed the
facts independently.104

97. Roton, 79 F.3d at 1116.
98. Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 23 (7th Cir. 1992)). See
generally McGirr, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
99. See State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 282-83 (Mo. 1997) (Stith, J., dissenting). The
court had written its own findings and conclusions, but the assistant attorney general submitted a
new set of findings and conclusions. The trial judge adopted the submitted suggestions verbatim.
Id. at 278-79.
100. See Kenley, 952 S.W.2d at 260-61 (“Those findings, though not the product of the
workings of the district judge’s mind, are formally his; they are not to be rejected out-of-hand,
and they will stand if supported by evidence.” (quoting El Paso, 376 U.S. at 656)).
101. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
102. Corbett v. State, 602 So.2d 1240, 1243-44 (Fla. 1992).
103. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d at 283 (“I do not believe we can affirm simply by deciding that a
reasonable judge could reach the findings and conclusions set out in the court’s judgment.”).
104. Id. at 281-85.
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IV. DOUBLE TROUBLE: THE DISTRICT COURT’S PROCEDURE AND THE
APPELLATE COURT’S STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

“Timing Is Everything”

In Anderson, the Court seemed to rely on the procedure used by the district
court as sufficient support to uphold the findings.105 In other cases, however,
parties may not have had the opportunity to review and respond to the
submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law. In such cases parties have
argued on appeal that their Due Process rights have been violated.106 This is
particularly so when judges have requested findings and conclusions ex parte,
and subsequently adopted those findings of fact and conclusions of law
verbatim.107 Without explicit guidance regarding the procedural aspects of
adopting findings and conclusions verbatim, courts remain confused as to
whether this practice is acceptable in all cases, and on appeal, whether the
clearly erroneous standard is the appropriate standard for review.
Generally, a court will request findings either prior to the trial, before the
case is submitted to the court, or after a full presentation of the evidence.108
For example, one Tennessee district court explained that it would request each
party’s counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
after the trial as though that party had prevailed.109 It will then use those
findings and conclusions to write its memorandum opinion, “rarely . . .
adopt[ing] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without making
alterations, based on the court’s independent research and consideration.”110
The Tennessee court also emphasized that occasionally cases will be of
such length or complexity that it requires counsel to assist in preparing the
opinion.111 If this occurs, the court explained that it would notify the parties in
writing and include the notification in the court file.112 Again, this step in the
court’s procedure indicates its attempt at being fair to both parties. An extreme
105. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572 (concluding that the lower court’s procedure was fair because
the losing party had the opportunity to respond to the submitted findings of fact).
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”). See, e.g., Bilzerian v. Shinwa Co. Ltd., 184 B.R. 389, 392
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Due process is denied a party when a judge adopts a party’s order verbatim,
without previously conclusively ruling on the matters in it.”).
107. See also Mullenix-St. Charles Properties, L.P. v. City of St. Charles, 983 S.W.2d 550,
555-56 (Mo. App. 1998).
108. See Kaplin, supra note 48, at 569.
109. See Hill & Range Songs, 413 F. Supp. at 969.
110. Id. (discussing its deviation from its normal procedure because the findings and
conclusions had been extensively briefed). See also Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d
326, 332 (4th Cir. 1983) (charging district courts to request findings and conclusions before
reaching and announcing a decision to use the submissions to analyze the relevant issues).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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example of court adopting findings and conclusions without independent
research and consideration is a court’s order that some appellate courts call a
“ghostwritten” order.113 A Florida district court described a ghostwritten order
as “an ex parte order which is not the product of personal analysis and
determination by the judge, but the overreaching and exaggeration of the
attorney who drafted it.”114 This inherent risk creates the need for an impartial
court115 to analyze the findings of fact and conclusions of law under a process
that is “fundamentally fair.”116
Reviewing the district court’s process to determine whether it is
“fundamentally fair” requires the cooperation of the court and counsel. An
appellate court will often analyze the orders or the opinion to determine
whether the district court played an “active and inquiring role” in applying the
Therefore, the demonstration of
submitted facts and conclusions.117
independent review is essential.118 While the court retains the duty to review
the submissions independently, counsel also has a duty to take advantage of
any opportunity to be heard. For example, in In re Dixie Broadcasting, the
court directed the prevailing counsel to address specific points to reach a
particular result when writing the court’s order.119 Instead of notifying the
parties in writing, as the Tennessee district court described, the lower court
announced its request in open court when all counsel were present.120 After

113. See Bilzerian, 184 B.R. at 392; In re Dixie Broad., Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1029 (11th Cir.
1989); In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 274-76 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Thomas E.
Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 950 (1995) (rejecting the possibility that appellate courts could use the same
“ghostwriting” procedures as district courts); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 273, 287 (1996) (discussing the recent, drastic changes in federal appellate
courts).
114. Bilzerian, 184 B.R. at 392.
115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) (1998) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”). See also Aiken County v. BSP Division of Envirotech Corp., 866 F.2d 661, 679
(4th Cir. 1989) (citing Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978) (“The question is
not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or
not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his [or her] impartiality on the basis
of all the circumstances.”).
116. See Colony Square, 819 F.2d at 276-77.
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d
228, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The central issue is whether the district court has made an independent
judgment.”).
119. See Dixie Broad., 871 F.2d at 1030.
120. Id. In other cases, the courts have outlined the general framework of the opinion for
counsel. See, e.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 572.
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the order was written, the losing party did not request to review the draft or to
make objections to it, even though opportunity to do so existed.121
Because there are numerous ways to achieve fairness to both parties, courts
will not always scrutinize the lower court’s exact procedure.122 If the appellate
court simply relies on the lower court’s integrity, appellants may feel as though
they are left without any recourse.123 If, however, the court follows a general
procedure that has been deemed to be “fundamentally fair,” then an appellant’s
claim of a due process violation will fail and the lower court’s opinion,
adopting the findings and conclusions verbatim, will be upheld.124
B.

Stricter Standard of Review

Since the decision in Anderson, the Supreme Court has continued to
uphold the clearly erroneous standard in cases where a lower court has adopted
findings and conclusions verbatim in its opinion.125 Unlike due process
challenges where the appellate court usually analyzes the lower court’s
procedure,126 in cases where parties challenge the clearly erroneous standard of
121. Dixie Broad., 871 F.2d at 1030. See, e.g., Lilly, 720 F.2d at 330 (rejecting the claim that
the trial court failed to perform its duty because the court had invited the losing party – twice – to
either respond or submit its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and the losing party
failed to do so).
122. See, e.g., Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1386 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“We tolerate the occasional use of this device because of our trust that district courts will closely
examine the proposed findings and will carefully consider the objections and arguments of the
opposing party.”) (emphasis added); Triad Elec. & Controls, Inc. v. Power Sys. Eng’g, Inc., 117
F.2d 180, 187 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[B]ased on our review of the record, we are confident that the
district court closely examined the proposals and likewise considered most carefully Triad’s
position.”) (emphasis added).
123. See Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 313 (7th Cir. 1986):
The wholesale adoption of a party’s proposed findings obscures the reasoning process of
the judge. It deprives this court of the findings that facilitate intelligent review. It causes
the losing litigants to conclude that they did not receive a fair shake from the court. If a
judge allows himself to act as a mouthpiece for the winning party, the loser may conclude
that the judge was not impartial – that he was an advocate, using an advocate’s words,
rather than a disinterested evaluator of the several advocates’ urgings. This is an
especially serious problem when the judge adopts language from a brief as opposed to
selecting from among findings of fact that have been proposed by one side and subject to
criticism by the other side.
Id. (citations omitted).
124. See Colony Square, 819 F.2d at 277.
125. See generally United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2038 n.10 (1998) (upholding
the clearly erroneous standard regarding district court’s findings of fact); Anderson, 470 U.S. at
564, 572; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-96 (1948). See also
MICHOL O’CONNOR, O’CONNOR’S FEDERAL RULES: CIVIL TRIALS 565 (1998).
126. See Marine Shale, 81 F.3d at 1386 (“While we discourage this practice [of adopting
findings and conclusions verbatim], we have never radically altered the standard of review in
such cases, much less concluded that such an adoption results in a per se due process violation.”).
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review in Rule 52, the appellate court will examine the sufficiency of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.127 If a party can present evidence
proving the trial court did not review and analyze the facts independently,
some circuits, the Fifth Circuit in particular, may fall away from the court’s
explicit application of the clearly erroneous standard and review the facts with
greater scrutiny.128 For example, the Fifth Circuit stated that if a court
mechanically adopts the findings, regardless of who prepared them, the court
will “take into account the District Court’s lack of personal attention to factual
findings in applying the clearly erroneous rule.”129 In these cases, however, it
may be important to note that the precedent pre-dates the Anderson decision.130
Conversely, in some cases, appellants distinguish the facts in their case
from those in Anderson, attempting to prove the facts are “inadequate” to
undergo judicial review.131 Having proven this, the appellant will then request
that the court analyze the facts with greater scrutiny – despite the Supreme
Court’s decision in Anderson. When parties request this form of review,
appellate courts look for evidence of independent thought, such as revisions to
the findings of fact and conclusions of law.132 For example, if the trial judge
made minimal revisions to the submitted facts, then an appellate court may
analyze the facts with stricter scrutiny.133 In Andre v. Bendix Corp., both
parties requested the court to give the findings a “more critical” reading on
appeal because the district court adopted “substantial portions” of Andre’s

127. Andre v. Bendix Corp., 774 F.2d 793. See generally 5A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 52.6 (Supp. 1997).
128. See Sierra Club, Lone Star Ch. v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing FDIC v. Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1989)); cf. SEC v.
Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 n.11 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to grant little deference to the
findings since they were adopted verbatim); see generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §
22.52 (3d ed. 1995).
129. Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d at 267 (citing Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc.,
615 F.2d 252, 258 (quoting Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th Cir. 1979))).
130. See id.
131. Andre, 774 F.2d at 793-94 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573).
132. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Our review of the
district court’s opinion remains deferential, but, in these circumstances, requires a closer and
harder look.”). Here, the district court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law
without any changes whatsoever, including the adoption of typographical errors. Id.
133. Id. See also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 574 (5th Cir. 1996)
(citing Texarkana Nat’l Bank, 874 F.2d at 267 (upholding the Fifth Circuit’s application of
stricter scrutiny if the trial judge adopts the prevailing party’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law verbatim)). Compare Alcock v. Small Bus. Admin., 50 F.3d 1456, 1459 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995)
(applying the clearly erroneous standard but exercising greater scrutiny since the trial judge did
not author the findings of fact in a bankruptcy case, where the court reviewed the facts de novo),
with Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 567 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the clearly
erroneous standard after due to the trial judge’s modifications to the findings of fact were
evidence he did not uncritically accept the findings submitted by the prevailing party).
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post-trial brief.134 This heightened review has not been universally accepted,
however, and appellate courts are wary to review the facts with a standard
different from the clearly erroneous standard.135 Because most circuits strictly
adhere to the clearly erroneous standard, instead of analyzing the findings with
greater caution, appellate courts may choose to reverse and remand the case.136
2.

The Inevitable Return

If the court declines to review the facts with greater scrutiny, the appellant
may request the case be remanded for a new trial, after either vacating or
reversing the decision.137 There are two main benefits to this option.138
Remanding the case “ensure[s] proper consideration of the district court,” and
it maintains the clearly erroneous standard without controversy.139 The Pentec
court explained that the clearly erroneous standard has been “undermined sub
silencio in some cases on appeal in an effort by the Courts of Appeal to
134. Andre, 774 F.2d at 793 n.6. While the verbatim adoption of findings and conclusions is
an accepted practice, the Second Circuit sharply criticized a trial court who partially adopted one
of the party’s briefs verbatim, stating, “We have disapproved this practice because it disguises the
judge’s reasons and portrays the court as an advocate’s tool, even when the judge adds some
words of its own . . . . Unvarnished incorporation of a brief is a practice we hope to see no more.”
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1990).
135. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 (3d Cir.
1993) (denying the request to review the findings, which had been adopted verbatim, with greater
scrutiny); Photo Elecs. v. Ferrex Corp., 581 F.2d 772, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1978) (reviewing the
procedure used by the trial judge and the evidence to review the adopted findings and then
applying the clearly erroneous standard of review); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works,
289 F.2d 355, 356 (5th Cir. 1961) (“[T]he same test is applied to the findings, whether the court
prepared them or adopted those submitted by counsel. The court’s adoption of appellee’s
findings does not impeach or discredit them. We accord them full weight.”); cf. Roberts, 344
F.2d at 751-52.
136. See supra Part IV.A; see also Falcon Const. Co. v. Economy Forms Corp., 805 F.2d
1229, 1232 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying a request to reverse in remand despite defects in the
procedure used by the trial judge); In re X-Cel, Inc., 776 F.2d 130, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1985)
(reversing and remanding the case because the facts were inadequate to undergo judicial review);
Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 258 (citing Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496,
501 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e reverse when the result in a particular case does not reflect the truth
and right of the case.”)). See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 128, §
22.52 n.454.
137. See Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls, Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 319 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(suggesting the appellate court reverse and remand to allow the district court to reconsider its
original holding); see also Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974); State v.
Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. 1997). Cf. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 288 F.2d at 724-25; Cuthbertson,
702 F.2d at 465 (reversing and remanding as a policy of the Fourth Circuit if the trial judge
adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim). See generally Oliver, supra note
44, at 699-701 (proposing that appellate court treat the determination of all applications of law to
fact as fact issues to unite both technical and non-technical legal standards).
138. Pentec, 776 F.2d at 319.
139. Id.
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compensate for inadequate consideration by a District Court.”140 This
alternative applies when there is absolutely no indication of the trial court’s
independent review.141 For example, in a recent Third Circuit case, the
remaining issue on appeal was the determination of attorneys’ fees.142 The
district court announced its intent for the parties to write findings of fact and
conclusions of law, whereupon the court would adopt one party’s findings of
fact as its opinion “without modification.”143 In making this announcement,
the court eliminated its duty to analyze the submissions from both parties and
come to its own independent judgment.144 The Third Circuit rejected this
procedure and remanded the case.145 In other cases, the court may reverse and
remand when the losing party has not had the opportunity to respond to the
other party’s findings of fact.146
An example of the potential effect of this method is in the final outcome of
Roberts v. Ross.147 After the Third Circuit vacated and remanded,148 the trial
court reversed its prior decision without a hearing or a new trial.149 Where the
court had previously determined the parties had not made a promise, on
remand, the court concluded the parties had made a promise on several
occasions.150
In a recent Seventh Circuit case, the court criticized the lower court for
adopting findings of fact so skewed that the opinion did not reflect the decision
of a neutral judge.151 Each party had presented only the most drastic remedies
to the court in their conclusions of law.152 When the trial judge adopted the
findings verbatim, the losing party had to endure the most drastic remedy while
the prevailing party “hit a home run.”153 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
supported the practice of adopting findings verbatim, but suggested that if the

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found. v. Canon-McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 232
(3d Cir. 1998).
143. Id. Neither party objected to this practice, thereby making the “strategic decision” to
waive their right to pursue this issue on appeal. Id. at 236.
144. See generally id. at 233.
145. Id. at 233, 235.
146. Id.
147. See Kaplin, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
148. Roberts, 344 F.2d at 753.
149. Kaplin, supra note 48, at 567-68.
150. Id.
151. Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 23 (7th Cir. 1992).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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parties submit findings that “hug the extremes,” the court should develop
alternatives of its own.154
V. ETHICS AND OBLIGATIONS
A.

Judges

In light of the Federal Rules, the district court has a duty to identify the
facts that satisfy the standards of Rule 52.155 Judge Frank described this factfinding duty as an “art,” involving “skill and judgment,” because the correct
facts will determine the outcome of a case.156 The wrong application of the
law may be corrected on appeal, but wrong facts cannot be changed unless the
appellant “overcomes the heavy burden of showing the facts are ‘clearly
erroneous’.”157 The importance of the judge’s fact-finding role cannot be
underestimated. Because the trial judge is “absorbed in the law administration
at first hand,” she holds “the most important office of government.”158
Ultimately, a court has an overarching duty to review the facts and
conclusions independently. A court’s failure to satisfy this duty usually results
in embarrassment in addition to wasted time and money. An extreme example
of this failure was the final outcome in Andre v. Bendix Corp., where an
employee claimed she had been discharged based upon her gender.159 After
both parties submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court
adopted fifty-four out of the fifty-five pages of findings of fact from the
prevailing party’s post-trial brief, including footnotes, citations, spelling, and
typographical errors,160 essentially “photocopying” the brief.161 On appeal, the
court looked for evidence of a “disinterested mind,” and included criticism of
the trial court’s verbatim adoption of the findings of fact.162 Due to the court’s
discretion, or lack thereof, the appellate court could not discern the lower

154. Id. See also Pennsylvania Envtl. Defense Found., 152 F.3d at 239-40 (Garth, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for stifling “innovative and nontraditional approaches” in
deciding cases in the district courts).
155. United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 n.42 (2d Cir. 1942).
156. Id. at 942-43.
157. Id. at 942.
158. Forness, 125 F.2d at 942 n.43 (citing Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014, 1037 (1948)).
159. Andre, 774 F.2d at 787.
160. Id. at 800. The court also noted that this wholesale adoption was even more harmful and
“embarrassing” because the district court failed to adopt a page containing the numbered facts.
Therefore, the court referred to numbered facts that did not exist in the final opinion. See id.
(citing Andre v. Bendix, 584 F. Supp. 1485, 1505-07 (N.D. Ind. 1984)).
161. Andre, 774 F.2d at 791.
162. Id. at 800.
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court’s reasoning, and thus vacated the prior judgment and remanded for a new
trial, each party bearing its own costs.163
The recognized source for guidance on ethical issues for the judiciary is
the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.164 The canons in this code are
the same as those in the Model Code of Conduct.165 The canons do not
explicitly state specific or formal direction for judges adopting findings of fact
and conclusions of law verbatim, but the Codes aid judges in their role as
impartial administrators of the law.166 When a court adopts findings and
conclusions verbatim without an independent review, the court abdicates its
role. Judicial opinions should reflect an unbiased review because, as one
commentator noted, “it is important that the parties be shown that their case
has been treated with intelligence and respect, [and] the way the opinion is
written has large consequences for the future.”167 Therefore, while the practice
of adopting findings and conclusions verbatim is not unethical per se, if a court
relinquishes its role, then critical issues arise regarding the court’s failure to
fulfill its duty.
B.

Lawyers

Requiring a court to single-handedly write findings of fact and conclusions
of law in all applicable cases is unrealistic.168 Simply stated, trial courts
operate more efficiently by relying on counsel to assist in preparing the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.169 This honors the tradition of lawyers
163. Id. at 801.
164. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GETTING
STARTED AS A FED. JUDGE 59 (1997). Materials regarding the judicial codes are also available in
the Westlaw database under “CONDUCT.”
165. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-5 (1990). The Canons are the
following:
(1) A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
(2) A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the
judge’s activities.
(3) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.
(4) A judge shall so conduct the judge’s extra-judicial activities as to minimize the
risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
(5) A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity.
Id.
166. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 1.02 at 3-4 (stating that
codes and rules are not used as an enforcement mechanism).
167. James Boyd White, What’s An Opinion For?, U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1995).
168. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 166, § 6.01, at 167-68. See also DAVID STEIN, JUDGING
THE JUDGES: THE CAUSE, CONTROL, AND CURE OF JUDICIAL JUSTICE 110-13 (1974).
169. Dearborn Nat. Cas. Co. v. Consumers Petroleum Co., 164 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1947),
cited in Louis Dreyfus & Cie., 298 F.2d at 739 n.5. Judge Minton stated:
While the burden and responsibility to make findings of fact and state conclusions of law
thereon are primarily upon the trial court, certainly counsel for the parties, especially the
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assisting judges in “clerical” matters, such as writing the findings of fact and
conclusions of law.170 Justice Miller analogized the trial judge’s need for
assistance from the lawyer to the appellate court’s need for the brief and oral
arguments.171
The duty to assist courts may, however, conflict with the attorney’s duty to
be a zealous advocate for the client.172 The conflict is heightened when a judge
adopts findings strictly verbatim.173 The findings, once signed, become the
findings of the court.174 One judge noted, “[e]xperience shows that counsel,
the most able, honorable, and conscientious . . . after the close of a hotlycontested case, are not in the frame of mind, ordinarily best suited to drafting
the findings, which must express the judgment of the court.”175 Due to the
nature of this inherent conflict, there is an even greater duty on the trial court
to review the findings and conclusions before adopting them verbatim.

prevailing party, have an obligation to a busy court to assist is in the performance of its
duty in this regard.
Id.
170. English v. English, 35 P. 1107, 1108 (Kan. 1894) (“[W]e see no objection to allowing an
attorney in the case to perform the clerical labor of writing up findings in accordance with the
decision of the court as announced, leaving to the judge only the duty of examining, correcting, if
necessary, and finally approving.”).
171. Schilling v. Schwitzer-Cummins Co., 142 F.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1944). While the
courts may rely on attorneys to draft the findings and conclusions, what most judges do not
mention in their opinions is the extensive use of law clerks to aid judges in their duties. With
respect to drafting the findings, according to Judge Morton, preparing a final draft is “largely
ministerial, and certainly rises to no higher level than the service performed by a law clerk.” Hill
& Range Songs, Inc. v. Fred Rose Music, Inc. 413 F. Supp. 967, 969 (M.D. Tenn. 1976). See
generally Mark W. Cannon & David M. O’Brien, Introduction to the Dynamics of the Judicial
Process, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 31
(1985). Justice William H. Rehnquist stated:
I think [people] would be shocked, and properly shocked to learn that an appellate judge
simply ‘signed off’ on such a draft without fully understanding its import and in all
probability making some changes in it. The line between having law clerks help one with
one’s work, and supervising subordinates in the performance of their work, may be a hazy
one, but it is at the heart . . . [of] the fundamental concept of ‘judging’.
Id. at 31 n.23.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities
(1998) (“As an advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system.”). See id. at Rule 1.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
7-101 (1983).
173. See Otero v. Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist., 470 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (D. Colo. 1979)
(“It is impossible for counsel in a case in which they are engaged to do anything impartially.”).
174. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1985).
175. Brenger v. Brenger, 125 N.W. 109 (1910), quoted in 1 F.R.D. at 85; In re Las Colinas,
426 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1st Cir. 1970).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are two major unresolved issues at the heart of the accepted practice
of adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim. First, there must
be a “fundamentally fair” procedure. At the time the rules were proposed, one
commentator suggested that instead of requiring findings and conclusions in
all cases, they should be required only in cases that would be appealed.176 As a
condition of appeal, the appealing party would “submit a draft of the proposed
findings to the trial judge with the option, if not the obligation, on the part of
the appellee to submit alternative findings for the judge’s consideration.”177
The present-day practice seems to reflect the commentator’s sentiments, but
fails regarding the unconditional “obligation” to share the findings with the
opposing party. Were this obligation to exist and become part of the practice
of adopting findings and conclusions verbatim, it would seem to reflect the
ambiguous notion of a procedure that is “fundamentally fair.”
Most circuits have outlined individual procedures for trial judges to
follow.178 For a procedure to be deemed “fundamentally fair,” the court should
request findings and conclusions from both parties, or at a minimum, allow the
losing party to respond to the opposing party’s submitted facts and
conclusions. Moreover, once those findings and conclusions have been
submitted and argued by both parties, the district court has a steadfast duty,
mandated by Model Code of Judicial Conduct and by the Supreme Court, to
review the facts independently. This review will largely determine whether
parties feel that the trial judge actually considered their arguments and
issues.179
The second major issue entails the proper standard of review on appeal.
The Supreme Court’s review of the procedure and eventual application of the
clearly erroneous standard seemed to resolve the issue. However, appellate
courts have still found occasions to review findings and conclusions adopted
verbatim by the trial court with heightened scrutiny by relying on precedent
existing before Anderson. Alternatively, the courts might forego any analysis
and remand the case. Despite the Federal Rules Committee’s best efforts at
drafting an unambiguous rule, the same issues that commentators emphasized
at its adoption still remain. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has not “ironed
out” the difficulties arising from the practice that grew out of Rule 52: the
verbatim adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In light of these issues and the fact that a court has the ultimate discretion,
a final resolution of this issue probably does not exist. There is nothing formal
176. Chestnut, supra note 15, at 572.
177. Id.
178. See Roberts, 344 F.2d at 752-53; Lilly, 720 F.2d at 332; Professional Golfers Assoc. of
Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 1975).
179. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 128, § 22.52.
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in Rule 52 addressing this issue, but there are certain prudential incentives that
prevent courts from abusing the practice. First, if serious attention was not
given to the submitted findings and conclusions, then a court will lose the
respect of the bar and the appellate court that oversees it. Undoubtedly, no
court wants to be in that position. As with the law itself, we rely on the
judiciary to carry out its duty to be impartial, which entails reviewing
submitted findings and conclusions – in fairness to both parties. Additionally,
we rely on parties who feel as though they have been wronged to appeal. On
appeal, we trust that the judiciary will apply a standard of review, whether or
not it applies a standard higher than the clearly erroneous standard in Rule 52,
again – in fairness to both parties.
KRISTEN FJELDSTAD

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

222

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:197

